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Abstract
Graph neural networks (GNNs) have achieved high perfor-
mance in analyzing graph-structured data and have been
widely deployed in safety-critical areas, such as finance and au-
tonomous driving. However, only a few works have explored
GNNs’ robustness to adversarial attacks, and their designs are
usually limited by the scale of input datasets (i.e., focusing
on small graphs with only thousands of nodes). In this work,
we propose, SAG, the first scalable adversarial attack method
with Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM).
We first decouple the large-scale graph into several smaller
graph partitions and cast the original problem into several
subproblems. Then, we propose to solve these subproblems
using projected gradient descent on both the graph topology
and the node features that lead to considerably lower mem-
ory consumption compared to the conventional attack meth-
ods. Rigorous experiments further demonstrate that SAG can
significantly reduce the computation and memory overhead
compared with the state-of-the-art approach, making SAG
applicable towards graphs with large size of nodes and edges.
Introduction
Graph neural networks (GNNs) play an essential role in many
emerging applications with graph data. On these applications,
GNNs show their strength in extracting valuable informa-
tion from both the features (i.e., information from individual
nodes) and the topology (i.e., the relationship between nodes).
For example, GNNs can effectively analyze financial data to
decide loan-related policies. Another example is the social
network with billions of users where GNNs can do friendship
recommendation.
Such wide deployment of GNNs motivates the investiga-
tion of their robustness and reliability. One of the key aspects
is to effectively generate adversarial examples on graph data,
so that we can better understand the “weakness” of GNNs
and secure them more wisely afterward. Our initial explo-
ration and studies identify several key properties to be consid-
ered in the GNN attack. First, the adversarial example needs
to consider topology and feature information to comprehen-
sively attack the GNNs on all perspectives. Second, the attack
method needs to be efficient in both memory and computation
for catering to the huge number of nodes in graph data.
Table 1: Comparison with the Existing Attack Methods.
Method Topology Feature Comp. Effi. Mem. Effi.
FGSM 7 ! ! !
PGD ! 7 ! 7
Nettack ! ! 7 !
SAG ! ! ! !
However, existing work inevitably falls in short at least one
of the above aspects, as summarized in Table 1. Specifically,
FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015) is crafted
for attacking traditional deep neural networks (DNNs). Even
though it can attack node embeddings with good computa-
tion and memory efficiency, it can not well support the graph
topology, which distinguishes GNNs from DNNs. PGD (Xu
et al. 2019a) is one of the state-of-the-art work designated
for the GNN attack. However, it does not support the attack
on node features, and it suffers a quadratic memory overhead
due to maintaining the large size of edge gradients in a dense
matrix format. For example, a graph with N nodes leads to a
dense N ×N gradient matrix, consuming more than 10GB
memory for a moderate-size graph with only 50, 000 nodes.
Another work, Nettack (Zügner, Akbarnejad, and Günne-
mann 2018), while performing well in three aspects, finds its
shortcoming in computation efficiency due to a fine-grained
edge manipulation in a very inefficient trial-and-error man-
ner.
To overcome these challenges, we propose SAG, the
first ADMM-attack on GNNs with the alternating direction
method of multipliers (ADMM), which iteratively maximizes
the training loss through modifying the graph topology and
the node features. ADMM has been shown to be effective
in dividing-and-conquering a large non-convex optimization
problem into multiple smaller ones for achieving both effi-
ciency and scalability (Fan et al. 2017; Leng et al. 2018; Liu
et al. 2020; Ren et al. 2019). As shown in the last line of
Table 1, SAG can attack both the graph topology and the
node features, while maintaining computation and memory
efficiency to a great extent, making it a viable and promising
solution for large-scale graphs.
In summary, our major contributions are:
• We identify and analyze the key properties of the effective
adversarial attacks on GNNs, where none of the existing
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methods could address all of them systematically and com-
prehensively.
• We propose SAG to effectively generate adversarial ex-
amples on graph neural networks based on both topology
attack and feature attack. We formulate SAG with the
ADMM optimization framework and achieve both high
memory and computation efficiency.
• Evaluation shows our proposed method can launch more
effective attacks compared with the state-of-the-art ap-
proaches while reducing the computation and memory
overhead, making it applicable towards large graph set-
tings.
Related Work
Graph Adversarial Attacks. Graph adversarial attacks aim
to maximize the accuracy drop on GNN models by intro-
ducing the perturbations, such as the modifications of the
graph topology and the node representations (feature embed-
dings). Existing GNN attacks can be broadly classified into
two major categories, poisoning attack (Zügner, Akbarnejad,
and Günnemann 2018; Zügner and Günnemann 2019) and
evasion (Dai et al. 2018) attack, depending on the time they
happen. The former (poisoning attack) happens during the
training time of the GNNs through modifying training data,
while the latter (evasion attack) takes place during the GNN
inference time by changing test data samples. Our proposed
SAG is a comprehensive attack method that can cover both
types of attack meanwhile offering significant computation
and memory efficiency compared with the existing attack
approaches.
ADMM Framework. ADMM (Boyd et al. 2011) is an op-
timization framework that is effective in decomposing and
solving optimization problems under constraints. The the-
oretical results of ADMM have been explored in (Gómez,
Eftekhari, and Cevher 2019; Poon and Liang 2019; Yu 2019;
Nishihara et al. 2015) for various convex problems under
diverse constraints and are shown to have linear convergence.
Formally, ADMM can effectively solve an optimization prob-
lem under linear constraints
min
x,z
f(x) + g(z)
subject to Ax +Bz = c
(1)
where f(x) and g(z) could be either differentiable or non-
differentiable but has some exploitable structure properties.
Then, by introducing the augmented Lagrangian function,
ADMM can break the problem into two subproblems in x
and z and iteratively solve each subproblem at one time.
While popular stochastic gradient descent (SGD) method
can usually solve optimization problems, SGD cannot effec-
tively process the case with diverse constraints (e.g., equality
constraints between variables) and usually require ad-hoc
modifications on gradients.
Although ADMM is originally developed to solve convex
problems, recent studies successfully exploit ADMM to solve
NP-hard non-convex problems under constraints in CNN
pruning (Fan et al. 2017; Zhang et al. 2018), compressive
sensing (Yang et al. 2016), Auto-ML (Liu et al. 2020), Top-K
Table 2: Notations and Definitions used in our paper.
G A single large graph
N The number of nodes
D The length of node features
E The number of edges in the original input graph
A The original input graph of shape N ×N
X The original input feature of shape N ×D
W Fixed GNN weights
S A perturbation matrix of shape N ×N
A˜ Perturbed adjacency matrix of shape N ×N
X˜ Perturbed features of shape N ×D
A The maximum number of allowed edge perturbations
X The maximum L2 norm of allowed feature perturbations
`(·, ·) The loss function to measure the difference between
the current output of the model and the targeted labels
M The number of subproblems to split
Si The ith ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} graph partition of shape NM ×N
X˜i The ith ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} feature copy of shape N ×D
ΠC [g] The projection of input g towards set C
K The number of epochs in ADMM
VGT Set of nodes with ground truth label
feature selection (Fan et al. 2017), and hardware design (Ren
et al. 2019). In this paper, we focus on exploring the benefit of
exploiting ADMM framework in the context of graph-based
adversarial attacks.
Methodology
Problem Formulation of Scalable Graph Attack
We first define the notation in this paper, as summarized in
Table 2. We consider an input graph G = (A,X), where
A ∈ {0, 1}N×N is the adjacency matrix on the edge con-
nection between nodes, X ∈ RN×D is the associated node
features, N is the number of nodes in the graph, and D is
the feature dimension of each node. Here, only a portion of
nodes VGT are labeled and the goal of node classification is
to predict labels for remaining nodes. Following the common
practice in the field (Xu et al. 2019a; Zügner, Akbarnejad, and
Günnemann 2018), we focus on the well-established work
that utilizes graph convolutional layers (Kipf and Welling
2017) for node classification. Formally, the ith layer is de-
fined as
H(k+1) = A˜H(k)W (k) (2)
where A˜ = D˜−
1
2 (A+ IN )D˜
− 12 to achieve numerical stabil-
ity, D is a diagonal matrix with Dii =
∑
j(A+ IN )ij , and
W (k) is the weights for the kth layer. Since the memory and
the computation complexity generally increase as the number
of layers increases, we focus on a single layer GCN that is
tractable and still captures the idea of graph convolutions:
Z = softmax(A˜XW ) (3)
Here, the output Z ∈ {1, 2, ..., c}N is the predicted labels for
individual nodes. The parameter W is learned by minimizing
the cross-entropy on the output of labeled nodes.
`(A,X;W,YGT ) = −
∑
v∈VGT
ln Zv,Yv (4)
where Yv is the ground truth label for node v. Our experi-
ments show that adversarial examples on this single layer
GCN model transfer well to GCNs with various layers and
other GNN models such as GAT. Besides, recent studies
(Zügner, Akbarnejad, and Günnemann 2018) show that a
L-layer GCN can also be treated as σ(ALXWL) to generate
adversarial attacks with tractable computation.
In this paper, SAG aims to generate a perturbed adja-
cency matrix A˜ ∈ {0, 1}N×N and a perturbed feature ma-
trix X˜ ∈ RN×D satisfying a pre-defined perturbation bud-
get. Similar to (Xu et al. 2019a), we use a Boolean matrix
S ∈ {0, 1}N×N to record the edge perturbations that Sij = 1
indicates the perturbation of edge between node i and node
j. Given the original adjacency matrix A and its supplement
matrix A¯ (i.e., A¯i,j = ¬Ai,j), we can generate the perturbed
adjacency matrix as A˜ = A + (A¯ − A) ◦ S, where ◦ is the
Hadamard product. Formally, given the edge perturbation
budget A and the feature perturbation budget X , SAG aims
to solve the following optimization problem
min
S,X˜
− `(S, X˜)
s.t. ||X˜ −X||22 ≤ X
1TS ≤ S , S ∈ {0, 1}N×N
(5)
For notation simplicity, we use `(S, X˜) to represent the cross-
entropy loss `(S, X˜;W,YGT ) when the context is clear. Fol-
lowing the common practice (Zügner, Akbarnejad, and Gün-
nemann 2018; Xu et al. 2019a) in the field, we consider two
threat models – the evasive attack and the poisoning attack.
The evasive attack assumes that the GNN model is fixed and
targets the test data. The poisoning attack targets the training
data and performs the model training phase on the perturbed
data after the attack.
There are several challenges in solving this optimization
problem. First, the popular stochastic gradient descent (SGD)
methods cannot effectively solve optimization problems un-
der constraints and usually require ad-hoc modification on the
gradients to satisfying such constraints. Second, the discrete
modification on the edge perturbations makes it a combinato-
rial optimization problem. (Zügner, Akbarnejad, and Günne-
mann 2018) attacks the graph topology by changing one edge
at one time and selecting the edges that achieve the maxi-
mum loss. However, this approach needs to trial-and-error on
all edges, leading to prohibitive time cost. (Xu et al. 2019a)
takes gradient on the S matrix by releasing the requirement
S ∈ {0, 1}N×N to be S ∈ [0, 1]N×N . However, this ap-
proach takes N × N memory to store the gradient matrix,
which is prohibitive for large graphs with tens of thousands
of nodes. Besides, (Xu et al. 2019a) only supports topology
attack and cannot conduct joint attack on the node features.
We detail ADMM-based SAG on solving the optimization
problems under constraints in later sections.
Scalable Graph Attack Framework using ADMM
SAG achieves a scalable attack on graph data by splitting
the matrix S into multiple partitions and consider one par-
tition at each time, as illustrated in Figure 1. Supposing we
split the graph into M partitions, we only need to take gra-
dient on a small matrix with shape NM × N that can easily
fit into the memory. Similar to (Xu et al. 2019a) and the
Part-M
𝑺(𝟎)
𝑿(𝟎)𝑵 𝑫
𝑵
𝑺𝑴𝟎𝑿𝑴𝟎𝑵 𝑫
𝑵𝑴
𝑺𝟏𝟎𝑿𝟏𝟎𝑵 𝑫
𝑵𝑴
...
𝑺𝑴𝒌𝑿𝑴𝒌𝑵 𝑫
𝑵𝑴
𝑺𝟏𝒌𝑿𝟏𝒌𝑵 𝑫
𝑵𝑴
...
𝒌 iteration for ADMM
𝒌 iteration for ADMM 𝑺(𝑲)𝑿(𝑲)𝑵 𝑫
𝑵
Part-1
Figure 1: Overview of SAG.
probabilistic view of node classification problem, we first
release the discrete constraints S ∈ {0, 1}N×N to contin-
uous constraints S ∈ [0, 1]N×N , where Sij indicates the
probability that an edge needs to be perturbed for attack.
Since the impact between node i and node j may be asym-
metry (i.e., the impact of node i on node j is higher than
the reverse one), we do not apply symmetry constraint on
S. Then, we split S ∈ [0, 1]N×N into M sub matrix such
that Si ∈ [0, 1](N/M)×N , where Si considers the nodes with
index between [
⌊
i ∗ NM
⌋
,
⌊
(i+ 1) ∗ NM
⌋
]. Due to the cumula-
tive property in cross-entropy loss, we can attack by solving
the following optimization problem
min
Si,X˜
−
M∑
i=1
`(Si, X˜)
s.t. ||X˜ −X||22 ≤ X
1TSi ≤ i, Si ∈ [0, 1](N/M)×N
(6)
Here, i represents the allowed number of edges to change in
each graph partition Si and we set it to be AM for simplicity.
Ideally, we can split the problem 6 into M sub-problems
and solve them independently for memory efficiency. How-
ever, problem 6 still has interaction betweenM sub-problems
on the X˜ term. To this end, we further reformulate the prob-
lem 6 into the following problem by substitute X˜ ∈ RN×D
with a duplicated feature matrix X˜i ∈ RN×D
min
Si,X˜i
−
M∑
i=1
`(Si, X˜i) +
M∑
i=1
ICSi(Si) +
M∑
i=1
ICXi(X˜i)
s.t. X˜i = X˜i+1, i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}
(7)
For notation simplicity, we use X˜M+1 to represent X˜1. IC(x)
is an indicator function such that IC(X) = 0 if X ∈ C,
otherwise IC(X) =∞. CSi and CXi are feasible sets
CSi = {Si | Si ∈ [0, 1] NM ×N , 1TSi ≤ i}
CXi = {X˜i | ||X˜i −X||22 ≤ X}
(8)
Here, the popular SGD cannot be easily applied
to the optimization problem 7 under constraints,
especially the equality ones. To this end, we can
adopt the ADMM framework to systematically solve
the problem. First, we have the Lagragian function
Lρ(X˜i, Si, µi) =−
M∑
i=1
`(Si, X˜i) +
M∑
i=1
ICXi(X˜i) +
M∑
i=1
ICSi(Si)
+
ρ
2
M∑
i=1
||X˜i − X˜i+1||2 +
M∑
i=1
µTi (X˜i − X˜i+1)
(9)
where ρ > 0 is a hyper-parameter and µi ∈ RN×D is the
dual variable.
Following the ADMM framework, we can solve the prob-
lem 7 by repeating for k ∈ {1, 2, ...,K} iterations and, in
each iteration, solving each Si and X˜i individually
X˜
(k+1)
i = argmin
X˜i
Lρ(X˜i, S
(k)
i , µ
(k)
i )
S
(k+1)
i = argmin
Si
Lρ(X˜
(k+1)
i , Si, µ
(k)
i )
µ
(k+1)
i = µ
(k)
i + ρ(X˜
(k+1)
i − X˜(k+1)i+1 )
(10)
which is respectively the feature update, topology update, and
dual update. We stress that we only need to solve the mini-
mization problem for a single graph partition Si ∈ R NM×N ,
leading to much reduced memory consumption compared to
(Xu et al. 2019a), which requires solving the whole graph
S ∈ RN×N at the same time. Here, the main memory over-
head comes from the duplicated feature X˜i ∈ RN×D. How-
ever, the feature dimension D is usually a fixed number
around 1000, which is much smaller than the number of
nodes N that may reach tens of thousands, or even millions.
Algorithm Subroutines for SAG Optimization
In this section, we present how to efficiently solve the above
problem and derive closed form formula for individual mini-
mization problems.
Feature Update. In feature update, we aim to find the feature
X˜i that minimizes
−`(S(k)i , X˜i)+ICXi(X˜i)+
ρ
2
||X˜i−X˜(k)i+1||2+µ(k) Ti (X˜i−X˜(k)i+1)
(11)
Here, `(·, ·) is the cross-entropy loss on the GNN predic-
tions, the last two terms are differentiable functions, but the
ICXi(·) function cannot be easily solved with gradient de-
scent method due to the∞ values for X˜i /∈ CXi. To this end,
we adopt a two-step strategy for the feature update. For the
first three terms that are differentiable, we use the gradient
descent method to access the gradient g(k)Xi on X˜i and get a
pseudo-perturbed feature X˜(k+1)
′
i
X˜
(k+1)′
i = X˜
(k)
i − ηk · g(k)Xi (12)
where ηk is the learning rate at iteration k. Note that the
update on feature X˜i depends only on the graph partition
S
(k)
i and does not involve with remaining graph partitions.
For the term ICXi(·), we refer to the projection method by
projecting the pseudo-perturbed feature onto the feasible set
CXi:
X˜
(k+1)
i = ΠCXi [X˜
(k)
i − ηk · g(k)Xi ]
g
(k)
Xi
= − ∂
∂Xi
`(S
(k)
i , X
(k)
i ) + ρ(X
(k)
i −X(k)i+1) + µ(k)
(13)
While computing the projection is a difficult task in general
and usually requires an iterative procedure to solve, we ex-
ploit the special structure of CXi and derive a closed-form
formula to analytically solve it.
Proposition 1. Given CX = {a | ||a − X||22 ≤ X}, the
projection of a to CX is
ΠCX (a) =
{
a+uX
1+u
if u > 0 and u =
√
||a−X||22
X
− 1
a if ||a−X||22 ≤ X
(14)
Proof: ΠCX (a) can be viewed as an optimization problem
min
R
||R− a||22
s.t. (R−X)T (R−X) ≤ X
(15)
We can derive its Lagrangian function as
L(R, u) = ||R− a||22 + u[(R−X)T (R−X)− X ] (16)
where u ≥ 0. Using the KKT condition we have the station-
ary condition that
∂L
∂R
= 2(R− a) + 2u(R−X) = 0 (17)
and get that R = a+uX1+u . We can also get the complementary
slackness that
u[(R−X)T (R−X)− X ] = 0 (18)
If u > 0, we need to have R = a+uX1+u and (R −X)T (R −
X) = X . By reformulating, we can have u =
√
||a−X||22
X
−1.
If u = 0 and ||a−X||22 ≤ X , we have R = a.
Topology Update. In topology update, we aim to minimize
the following function by finding Si
−`(Si, X˜(k+1)i ) + ICSi(Si) (19)
Similar to feature update, we can first use the gradient descent
method to access the gradient g(k)Si on Si and then use the
projection method to generate the perturbed topology in the
feasible set CSi
S
(k+1)
i = ΠCSi [S
(k)
i − ηt · g(k)Si ]
g
(k)
Si
= − ∂
∂Si
`(Si, X˜
(k+1)
i )
(20)
where ηt is the learning rate. With the Langrangian function
and KKT condition, we can derive the closed-form formula
to analytically project gkSi to the feasible set CSi . Due to the
similarity with proof for Proposition 1 and page limits, we
leave the detailed proof to appendix.
Proposition 2. Given CSi = {Si | Si ∈ [0, 1]
N
M×N , 1TSi ≤
i}, the projection of a to CSi is
ΠCSi (a) =
{
P[0,1](a− u1) if u > 0 and 1TP[0,1](a− u1) = i
P[0,1](a) if 1TP[0,1](a) ≤ i
(21)
where P[0,1](x) = x, if x ∈ [0, 1]; 0, if x < 0; 1, if x > 1.
Optimization and Complexity Analysis. We summarize
our SAG in Algorithm 1. There are two optimization loops.
Algorithm 1: SAG to solve Problem 7.
1 Input: Given A, X, fixed GNN weights W , learning rate ηt,
epoch number K, and partition number M ;
2 Initialize: Si = Ai, Xi = X
3 for k = 1, 2, ...,K do
4 for i = 1, 2, ...,M do
5 Feature Update on X˜i:
6 X˜k+1i = ΠCXi [X˜
k
i − ηk · gkXi ] with Eq 13.
7 Topology Update on Si:
8 Sk+1i = ΠCSi [S
k
i − ηt · gkSi ] with Eq 20.
9 Dual Update on µi:
10 µk+1i = µ
k
I + ρ · (X˜k+1i − X˜k+1i+1 ) with Eq 10.
11 end
12 end
13 Sample and generate the final perturbed matrix.
In the inner loop, we iterate through M graph partitions and
update the corresponding partitioned graph perturbation Si
and feature perturbation X˜i. At each iteration, only a single
graph partition Si needs to be considered and large memory
is saved for not considering the other M − 1 partitions. In
the outer loop, we repeat the optimization for K (=200 by
default) iterations for the algorithm to converge.
After K iterations, X˜i will be identical to each other and
can be directly used as the feature perturbation X˜ . Recalling
that Si is a probability whether an edge needs to be per-
turbed for attack, we use Bernoulli distribution to sample
a 0-1-valued edge between each pair of nodes. We repeat
this sample procedure for 20 times and select the one with
minimal loss for the final perturbed topology S ∈ RN×N .
The memory complexity of SAG is
O(
N
M
·N +N ·D) (22)
for storing graph partition Si and feature perturbation X˜i, re-
spectively, since we only need to optimize one graph partition
at each iteration. We store only the current graph partition
in the limited GPU memory (around 10 GB) and offload the
remaining graph partitions to the large host memory (more
than 50 GB). Note that the same implementation strategy can-
not be applied to (Xu et al. 2019a) which requires attacking
the whole graph S ∈ RN×N at each iteration.
Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate SAG on five datasets and compare
with three attack algorithms to show its effectiveness.
Datasets. In this experiment, we select various datasets
to cover the vast majority of the GNN inputs, including
typical datasets (Citeseer, Cora, Pubmed, and Amazon-
Computer/Photo) used by many GNN papers (Kipf and
Welling 2017; Xu et al. 2019b; Hamilton, Ying, and Leskovec
2017). Details of these datasets are listed in Table 3.
Baselines. To evaluate the effectiveness of SAG, we com-
pare it with the state-of-the-art attack methods by using the
adversarial attack repository DeepRobust 1.
1https://github.com/DSE-MSU/DeepRobust.git
Table 3: Datasets for Evaluation.
Dataset #Vertex #Edge #Dim #Class
Cora 2,708 10,858 1,433 7
Citeseer 3,327 9,464 3,703 6
Amazon-Photo 7,487 119,043 745 8
Amazon-Computer 13,381 245,778 767 10
Pubmed 19,717 88,676 500 3
• FGSM (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015) is a
gradient-based adversial attack that generates adversar-
ial examples by perturbing the input features. While it is
originally designed for attacking CNNs, it can be easily
adapted to attack GNNs by perturbing node features.
• PGD (Xu et al. 2019a) is another gradient-based attack
method tailored for discrete graph data. The reason to
select PGD for comparison is that it provides fast attack on
discrete graph data by leveraging an optimization-based
approach.
• Nettack (Zügner, Akbarnejad, and Günnemann 2018) is
the most popular attack algorithm on graph data by incor-
porating both edge and feature attacks. We select Nettack
for comparison because it serves as a strong baseline for
SAG on the joint attack.
Models. Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) (Kipf and
Welling 2017) is one of the most popular GNN architec-
tures. It has been widely adopted in node classification, graph
classification, and link prediction tasks. Besides, it is also
the key backbone network for many other GNNs, such as
GraphSage (Hamilton, Ying, and Leskovec 2017), and dif-
ferentiable pooling (Diffpool) (Ying et al. 2018). We use
the setting of hidden dimension size = 16 for each layer of
GCN. Graph Attention Network (GAT) (Xu et al. 2019b),
another typical category of GNN, aims to distinguish the
graph-structure that cannot be identified by GCN. GAT dif-
fers from GCN in its aggregation function, which assigns
different weights for different nodes during the aggregation.
We use the setting of 8 hidden dimension and 8 attention
heads for each layer of GAT.
Platforms. We implement SAG based on PyTorch Geomet-
ric (Fey and Lenssen 2019). We evaluate SAG on Dell T7910
(Ubuntu 18.04) with Intel Xeon CPU E5-2603, 64 GB host
memory, and an NVIDIA 1080Ti GPU with 12 GB memory.
Metrics. We evaluate SAG with six metrics – evasive ac-
curacy, poisoning accuracy, topology ratio, feature ratio,
memory consumption, and running time. Following the com-
mon setting (Zügner, Akbarnejad, and Günnemann 2018; Xu
et al. 2019a), we report the evasive accuracy by assuming
the GNN model is fixed and targeting the test data. We re-
port the poisoning accuracy by targeting the training data
and perform the model training phase after the attack. The
topology ratio (%) is computed as the number of attacked
edges over the number of existing edges in the clean graph
dataset. The feature ratio (%) is reported as the L2 norm of
perturbed features over the L2 norm of the original features
in the clean graph dataset. To measure the memory, we utilize
NVProf to query the runtime GPU memory consumption at a
pre-selected frequency of 100 ms. To measure the time, we
leverage the software timer from python time library. For a
Table 4: Evaluation of SAG with existing adversarial attacks.
Dataset Method Time (min) Mem. (GB) Evasive Acc. (%) Poisoning Acc. (%)
Cora
Clean 0 0 79.63 79.63
FGSM 0.05 0.64 70.52 78.87
PGD 0.25 1.03 75.70 70.77
Nettack 14.75 0.68 69.62 71.35
SAG 0.48 0.70 68.06 67.15
Citeseer
Clean 0 0 71.80 71.80
FGSM 0.03 0.41 67.00 71.70
PGD 0.18 0.97 69.08 67.30
Nettack 12.63 0.60 62.91 67.54
SAG 0.34 0.82 62.62 63.68
Amazon
Photo
Clean 0 0 93.11 93.11
FGSM 0.05 1.17 89.13 91.37
PGD 4.21 3.69 83.02 82.77
Nettack 1560 1.84 87.95 89.25
SAG 6.13 1.24 80.52 80.12
Amazon
Computer
Clean 0 0 89.29 89.29
FGSM 3.28 2.67 85.62 88.03
PGD 17.32 10.59 77.22 77.93
Nettack 2578 4.35 82.41 85.33
SAG 18.78 2.91 74.56 76.31
Pubmed
Clean 0 0 77.53 77.53
FGSM 9.83 3.54 72.93 74.25
PGD - OOM - -
Nettack 3108 8.17 67.72 76.25
SAG 47.62 3.63 62.71 36.27
1 Note that “-” means such parameter is not applicable to the given setting.
2 OOM refers to “Out of Memory”.
fair comparison, all gradient-based approaches are conducted
for 200 iterations.
Overall Performance
Table 4 shows the overall performance comparison between
SAG and existing adversarial attacks under the same set-
ting of topology ratio and feature ratio. Following the most
common setting used by many previous papers (Zügner, Ak-
barnejad, and Günnemann 2018; Xu et al. 2019a), we select
the same topology attack ratio of 5% and feature attack ratio
of 2%, and leave the study on diverse ratios to the ablation
study. On PGD and FGSM, we only attack the topology and
features, respectively, due to their limits in attacking capabil-
ity. In SAG, we stick to M=2 and will exhibit the impact of M
in the ablation study. We observe that SAG consistently out-
performs the state-of-the-art attack approach, such as FGSM,
PGD, and Nettack on evasive attack (up to 14.82% accuracy
drop) and poisoning attack (up to 41.26% accuracy drop)
across different datasets. On Pubmed dataset, SAG achieves
14.82% accuracy drop in evasive attack and 41.26% in poi-
soning attack. The major reason for such success is that SAG
enables the gradient-based joint optimization on both the
features and topology while incorporating global reasoning
on the interaction between attacking different nodes. By con-
trast, FGSM and PGD attack only the feature or topology,
and Nettack considers only one edge at each time, failing to
reason the global interaction across edges and nodes.
Across different datasets and settings, we notice that Net-
tack always comes with the highest time cost. The reason is
that, at each iteration, it selects only one edge or feature to
attack by examining all edges and node features, and repeats
the procedure until reaching the topology ratio and the feature
ratio. Moreover, we observe that PGD usually has the high-
est memory consumption, since it requires a floating-point
N ×N matrix to store the edge gradients between each pair
of nodes, where N is the number of nodes. For Pubmed, a
single matrix of this shape requires at least 1.5 GB to store
and PGD processes the whole matrix at each iteration, in-
stead of processing only a small partition as the case in SAG.
Besides, in the time and memory comparison among these
implementations, we notice the significant strength of SAG,
which achieves up to 254× speedup and 3.6× memory re-
duction. This is largely due to our effective algorithmic and
implementation optimizations that can reduce the runtime
complexity meanwhile amortizing the memory overhead to
great extent.
Ablation Studies
In this ablation study, we will focus on two representative
datasets – Cora and Pubmed – for the performance of SAG
on a small graph dataset and a large graph dataset.
ADMM Convergence Behavior We show the ADMM
convergence behavior in Figure 2. Here, we adopt the same
number of epochs as T = 200 and show only the first 70
epochs in Figure 2b and Figure 2c since SAG converges
fast on ||X˜(k)i − X˜(k)i+1||2 and ||X˜(k+1)i − X˜(k)i ||2. We only
present the result for i = 1 since various i’s show similar re-
sults. Overall, SAG converges gracefully as epoch increases,
demonstrating the effectiveness of our method. In Figure 2a,
with the increase of the epoch number, SAG gradually in-
creases the attack loss by perturbing the features and the
topology. In Figure 2b, ||X˜(k)i − X˜(k)i+1||2 starts from 0 since
we initialize both X˜i and X˜i+1 to the node features on clean
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Figure 2: Convergence Behavior of SAG on Cora and Pubmed.
Table 5: Accuracy (%) of SAG under the diverse ratio of
perturbed edges and feature attacks on Cora and Pubmed.
Cora Feature Perturbation (%)
Topology
Perturbation
(%)
0 1 2 4 8
0 79.63 79.25 78.91 78.84 78.73
5 70.47 69.11 68.71 66.52 65.59
10 58.63 57.29 56.34 55.23 53.77
15 50.15 49.60 47.53 47.04 46.73
20 45.37 43.46 43.06 42.71 41.65
Pubmed Feature Perturbation (%)
Topology
Perturbation
(%)
0 1 2 4 8
0 77.53 75.34 73.91 72.55 68.65
5 49.19 39.14 36.27 31.65 28.53
10 33.24 28.57 27.81 26.35 25.30
15 28.04 26.05 23.59 23.04 22.34
20 23.95 21.62 21.09 20.71 20.38
Table 6: Impact of M for Poisoning Attack on Pubmed.
M Time Memory Accuracy Drop(min) (GB) (%)
1 33 5.72 35.37
2 42 3.63 36.27
4 62 2.75 36.18
8 95 2.21 35.97
graph dataset. Compared across different datasets, Pubmed
converges faster than Cora since Pubmed contains much
smaller feature dimension than Cora.
Topology and Feature Perturbation For poisoning at-
tack on Cora dataset (Table 5), the increase of feature per-
turbation and topology perturbation would both lead to the
accuracy drop compared with the original clean data. Besides,
we observe that, at the same level of topology perturbation,
8% feature perturbation can lead to 3.6% extra accuracy drop
on average. On Pubmed dataset, we observe that 8% feature
perturbation can lead to 9.4% extra accuracy drop, averaged
over various topology perturbation ratio. These results show
the benefit of attacking both topology and features.
M-value Impact We also evaluate SAG for poisoning
attack on Pubmed to show the impact of the hyperparameter
M (i.e., the number of graph partitions) on memory saving.
As shown in Table 6, with the increase of the M value, the
memory size reduction becomes significant, since splitting
the graph into M partitions and attacking individual partitions
at each time essentially reduce the memory requirement. We
also observe similar accuracy drop under different M since
SAG converges gracefully and hits similar optimal points for
diverse M. Meanwhile, we also observe that the increase of
value M also brings the runtime overhead in terms of time
Table 7: SAG Transferability for Poisoning Attack.
Cora (%) Pubmed (%)
1-layer GCN 0.67 (0.80) 0.35 (0.77)
2-layer GCN 0.78 (0.83) 0.80 (0.85)
4-layer GCN 0.74 (0.81) 0.76 (0.84)
1-layer GAT 0.74 (0.82) 0.37 (0.79)
2-layer GAT 0.77 (0.83) 0.78 (0.85)
4-layer GAT 0.75 (0.80) 0.73 (0.82)
1 Data Format: attacked data acc. (clean data acc.).
cost, for example, M=8 setting is 33 minutes slower than
M=4 setting. This slowdown happens since we need to attack
individual split graphs at each time, leading to a small portion
of system overhead on memory access. This also leads to
a tradeoff among these factors when selecting the value of
M. We also observe that the memory consumption does not
decrease linearly as K increases. The main reason is that, as
M reduces, memory consumption from other sources (e.g.,
loading PyTorch framework and the features) becomes the
dominant component.
Transferability To demonstrate the transferability of SAG,
we further evaluate our attacked graphs (Cora and Pubmed)
on GCNs (with 1, 2, and 4 layers) and GATs (with 1, 2, and
4 layers), respectively. We generate adversarial examples on
a 1-layer GCN model and conduct poisoning attack on other
models by targeting the training data and training these mod-
els on the perturbed data. As shown in Table 7, SAG can
effectively maximize the accuracy drop on Cora (up to 13%)
and Pubmed (up to 42%). The major reason for such success
in launching the poisoning attack is that the adversarial attack
on 1-layer GCN effectively captures the intrinsic property
on the graph data that is agnostic to the models. We want to
stress that, even on models with different layers (i.e., 2 and
4), the poisoned graph data can still achieve 8% and 9% ac-
curacy drop on Cora and Pubmed, respectively. These results
demonstrate the transferability of SAG towards models with
diverse architectures and the number of layers.
Conclusion
This work focuses on GNN robustness by giving an in-depth
understanding of GNN’s “weakness”. We propose SAG, the
first scalable adversarial attack method with Alternating Di-
rection Method of Multipliers (ADMM), which can success-
fully overcome the limitations of the previous solutions. Ex-
tensive experiments further highlight SAG’s advantage of
reducing the computation and memory overhead over the
existing approaches.
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Proof of Proposition 2
In this section, we provide the proof for Proposition 2. Similar
to the proof in Proposition1 and existing works on projection
(Leng et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2018; Xu et al. 2019a), we
utilize the Langrangian function and the KKT contition to
derive a closed-form formula to project a given input towards
the feasible set CSi .
Proposition 2. Given CSi = {Si | Si ∈ [0, 1]
N
M×N , 1TSi ≤
i}, the projection of a to CSi is
ΠCSi (a) =
{
P[0,1](a− u1) if u > 0 and 1TP[0,1](a− u1) = i
P[0,1](a) if 1TP[0,1](a) ≤ i
(23)
where P[0,1](x) = x, if x ∈ [0, 1]; 0, if x < 0; 1, if x > 1.
Proof: We first transform the projection problem ΠCSi into
an optimization problem
min
R
1
2
||R− a||22
s.t. R ∈ [0, 1] NM ×N
1tR ≤ i
(24)
Then, we can derive its Langrangian function as
L(R, u) =
1
2
||R− a||22 + I[0,1](R) + u(1TR− i) (25)
where u ≤ 0 is the dual variable. Here, I[0,1](R) = 0 if R ∈
[0, 1]
N
M×N ; = ∞ otherwise. Using the KKT condition, we
have the stationary condition that
∂L
∂R
= (R− a) + u1 + ∂
∂R
I[0,1](R) = 0 (26)
Here, ∂∂RI[0,1](R) = 0 if R ∈ [0, 1]
N
M×N ; = ∞ otherwise
We have R = P[0,1](a − u1), where P[0,1](x) = x, if x ∈
[0, 1]; = 0, if x < 0; = 1, if x > 1, and P[0,1](x) is
element-wisely applied on (a − u1). Using the KKT con-
dition, we also have the complementary slackness
u(1TR− i) = 0 (27)
If u = 0, we need to have R = P[0,1](a). If u > 0, we need
to have R = P[0,1](a − u1) and 1TR − i = 0. In other
words, we have 1TP[0,1](a − u1) = i, where u is a scalar
variable and can be solved with the bisection method (Boyd
et al. 2011).
